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This study is an evaluation of Sasebo Harbor as a typhoon
"haven". Characteristics of the harbor discussed include moor-
ings, facilities available, wind and wave action, storm surge
and the topographical effects on winds prior to and during the
passage of tropical cyclones. Problems to be considered when
remaining in port and possible evasion procedures are examined.
The tracks of tropical cyclones from 1947-1973 for the western
North Pacific were analyzed to determine the probability of
threat to the harbor. Observations by the author and informa-
tion obtained in conversations with harbor authorities are u-
tilized in reaching conclusions. The conclusion reached by
this study is in full agreement with the previous study by
Fleet Weather Facility, Yokosuka (1967), which considered
Sasebo Harbor to be a safe typhoon haven for all but the larg-
est of naval ships (CVA, CVS). For these units evasion must
commence early since the waters near Sasebo are restricted. To
aid commanding officers, an operationally oriented flow dia-
gram is presented which summarizes the locations of the vari-
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One of the most destructive weather phenomena a ship
may encounter, whether it be in port or at sea, is the tropi-
cal cyclone and, in particular, the typhoon. The commanding
officer, when faced with an approaching severe tropical cy-
clone or typhoon, must make the following timely decision:
should the ship remain in port, evade at sea, or, if at sea,
should the ship seek shelter in a harbor?
For most western North Pacific harbors there is insuffi-
cient or inadequately documented evidence as to the degree
of shelter which the port affords ships from typhoons.
Furthermore, the uncertainty associated with an anticipated
typhoon track and intensity makes it difficult to provide
reliable estimates of wind and sea conditions to be expected
well in advance of a typhoon's passage. Consequently, the
prudent mariner has found it advisable to commence evasive
action upon the first indication that a typhoon may strike
the port in which his ship is berthed. Considering the
majority of harbors, this is undoubtedly true. However, it
is becoming clear that there are certain harbors where some
ships would be safer in port than at sea. Previous studies
on the harbors of Hong Kong (Mautner and Brand, 1973),
Kaohsiung and Chilung (Keelung) in Taiwan (Brown, 1974) and
Subic Bay and Manila in the Republic of the Philippines
(Douglass, 1974) have been completed and provide much

information about these harbors. This study evaluates the
harbor of Sasebo, Japan as a "Typhoon Haven".
It is not possible to unequivocally declare a certain
harbor as "safe" or "unsafe" due to the many variables in-
volved as to ship type, harbor characteristics, ship's posi-
tion within the harbor, the orientation of the typhoon track
relative to the harbor, etc. The less tangible factors which
must also be considered are included in the overall "measure
of a harbor"
.
1.2 THE "MEASURE OF A HARBOR"
"The measure of a harbor is the sum total of many
individual factors. It is in the extent of its shelter,
depth of water at the piers, quantity and condition of its
service craft and the efficiency of its port services. It
is measured by the experience level of its port services
officer. It is in the skill, spirit and will of his crews.
It is in the emergency capability of the Ship Repair Facility
to make a ship ready for sea. It is the quality of the ty-
phoon warning service and the lead time provided the Senior
Officer Present Afloat (SOPA) to make sound command decisions
and to the Port Services Officer to carry out smoothly and
efficiently his flexible plan of action. Finally, the meas-
ure of a harbor is knowledge of that harbor and all that it
connotes in the mind of the Senior Officer Present Afloat
who, by his decisions, will stamp it as a vital refuge to be
taken or as an inanimate limited shelter to refuse as a
- 9 -

harbor for the ships under his charge." (U.S. Fleet Weather




2.1 DEFINITION AND DEVELOPMENT
A tropical cyclone is a low pressure disturbance whose
warm central core extends to relatively high levels in the
troposphere. In order for the tropical cyclone to intensi-
fy, tremendous amounts of energy are required to develop and
sustain the high wind velocities characteristic of severe
tropical cylones. Only the warm, moisture-laden air of the
tropics possesses this quantity of energy. The area between
the latitudes 5-20N and from 170E to the Philippine Islands
produces more intense tropical cyclones than any other region
in the world.
2.2 CLASSIFICATION
By international agreement, tropical cyclones have been
classified according to their maximum sustained winds as
follows:
Tropical Depression: Maximum sustained winds do
not exceed 33 knots.
Official consecutively numbered warnings are
disseminated by the Fleet Weather Central/
-*-The maximum winds referred to usually occur near the
center and near the eye wall. However, strong winds will usu-
ally extend a considerable distance outward from the center,
particularly in the dangerous semi-circle. In this connection,
sustained wind is defined as the average wind over a specified
time period, (usually, one-two minutes). The wind will be




Joint Typhoon Warning Center/Guam (FWC/JTWC)
on tropical depressions which are forecast to
become tropical storms within 4& hours. In
WESTPAC, FWC/JTWC issues these warnings with
immediate precedence at six-hourly intervals.
Tropical Storm: Maximum sustained winds between
34 and 63 knots.
Most of the tropical depressions will in-
tensify into tropical storms. Tropical
storms are named in alphabetical order from
four consecutive lists of women's names.
Typhoon: Maximum sustained winds in ex-
cess of 63 knots.
About two-thirds of the tropical storms in-
tensify to typhoon force. At this stage, the
well-known "eye" with relatively calm winds
and clear skies will develop at the center.
The "eye" is surrounded by a wall of clouds





The majority of tropical cyclone tracks conform to a
general pattern by initially moving west-northwest from the
source region. Steered by the prevailing easterlies, the
tropical cyclone moves at speeds from & to 14 kt. Normally,
upon reaching latitudes between 20-30 N, tropical cyclones
- 12 -

are influenced by the prevailing westerlies and undergo "re-
curvature". This implies that the west-northwest movement
gradually shifts to a northeasterly direction. After recurva-
ture, the tropical cyclone's speed of movement can accelerate
within 4$ hours to as much as two to three times the speed
at the point of recurvature (Burroughs and Brand, 1972).
However, in conjunction with the increase in speed of move-
ment, a gradual weakening occurs as the tropical cyclone
moves over cooler waters or when cool surface air enters the
storm system. Figure 1 summarizes the major characteristics
of "recurvers" and their monthly variations.
It is important to keep in mind that the course of
individual storms cannot be said to follow any standardized
pattern. Numerous typhoons have followed extremely erratic
courses, even making occasional loops in their tracks. For
this reason, the progress of each typhoon should be closely
monitored for changes in intensity, direction and speed of
movement. The mean monthly tropical cyclone tracks are
presented as Appendix A.
2.4 WIND CIRCULATION AND INTENSITY
The counter-clockwise wind circulation about the eye of
a typhoon in the Northern Hemisphere is depicted in Figure
2. Note that in the upper portion of Figure 2, the wind
circulation and typhoon speed of movement are in essentially
the same direction, This results in winds of great intensity
and a high sea state. Ships located in the forward right
- 13 -

quadrant tend to be pushed into the path or center of the ty-
phoon as a result of the circulation pattern. For these rea-
sons, this area is known as the "dangerous" semicircle.
In the lower quadrants, the typhoon direction of move-^
ment and wind circulation are opposed. This results in a
somewhat calmer sea state and less intense relative winds
than in the "dangerous" semicircle. Ships in the lower rear
quadrant will be pushed into the wake of the typhoon by the
circulation pattern. The lower two quadrants comprise the
"navigable" semicircle. The terms "navigable" and "danger-
ous" are used in a relative sense. The winds and seas are
dangerous anywhere near the center of a typhoon.
2.5 SEA STATE
Wave development is a function of wind intensity (the
stronger the wind, the more rapid the development and the
greater is the maximum height of fully developed waves),
wind duration, and the distance (fetch) over which the wind
has acted.
Since the strongest winds are found just outside the
eye, it is here that the seas develop most rapidly. The
swells traveling out ahead of the storm originate in the
"dangerous" semicircle while those traveling toward the rear
originate in the "navigable" semicircle.
The waves generated near the center usually travel fast-
er than the storm and are often observed well ahead of the
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Figure 1. Seasonal variation at point of recurvature of (a)
latitude and longitude [in brackets]; (b) speed of movement;
(c) size; and (d) maximum surface wind for the recurving
tropical storms and typhoons from May - December (1945-1969)
The number in parentheses below each month is the number of
recurving tropical storms and typhoons observed for each
month. The size parameter is the diameter of circulation
as deduced from the average diameter of the outer closed




Figure 2. Wind circulation of a tropical cyclone in the
Northern Hemisphere indicating the "dangerous" and






commonly referred to as "forerunners". It is important to
realize that sea conditions affecting ship movement will ex-
tend well beyond the wind field associated with a tropical
cyclone. A miscalculation concerning sea conditions could
result in a destructive rendezvous with the storm.
2For further discussion of sea states around tropical cy-
clones, refer to Brand, Blelloch, and Shertz , 1973: "State






Figure 3 shows the position of Japan in the western part
of the North Pacific Ocean. The four main islands, Hokkaido,
Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu are traversed by a series of
mountain ranges which run through the islands with relative-
ly small plain areas between the mountains and the surround-
ing seas.
A detailed study of the coast and harbors of Japan is
included in H. 0. Pub. 156, Sailing Directions (Enroute) for
Japan. For specific comments on navigation aids and coastal




Figure 3. Geographical location of Sasebo
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• 4. SASEBO - GENERAL DESCRIPTION
4.1 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
Sasebo is located on the southern shore of the north-
western tip of Kyushu. The Kyushu Mountains extend from
north to south through the center of the island (See Figure
4). The mesoscale topography of the northwestern tip of
Kyushu is depicted in Figure 5. Note the presence of a 1000
-2000 foot mountain range to the northeast of Sasebo. This
provides excellent protection from tropical cyclones passing
to the east of Sasebo.
4.2 SASEBO HARBOR
The port of Sasebo, located at 33° 10' N, 129° 43' E,
is one of the two major Japanese ports frequented by U. S.
Navy ships. The port was established as a naval base in
1&£6. Prior to and during World War II, it was an important
repair base and, since the war, it has become a major commer-
cial and shipbuilding port.
The inner harbor of the port is the northern extension
of the outer harbor. The channel depth at the main entrance
to the bay is over 110 ft, while the channel leading to the
inner harbor is over 40 ft deep. The current flows at a
maximum speed of 1.5 kt in the vicinity of the harbor en-
trance during a rising tide. The speed of current is faster























Figure 5. Topography of the northwestern tip of Kyushu,
- 22 -

not so strong as to hinder navigation. There is no record
of a tsunami (tidal wave), affecting the harbor.
Figure 6a shows the location of India Basin in the
inner harbor where Commander Service Group Three is located
and Figure 6b provides a close-up of India Basin. This
basin is used by large vessels, while Juliet Basin is util-
ized by harbor craft. The area between India and Juliet
Basins, known as "Tategami" is the resting place of about 15
mothballed LST's. During the passage of a severe typhoon
close to Sasebo, these vessels provide a potential danger to
other ships since they could break loose. This problem is
recognized by the Operations Department of Fleet Activities
and the vessels are therefore checked periodically.
The outer harbor provides numerous anchorages in a sea-
bed with excellent holding strength. Typhoon anchorages
are located in the vicinity of Ebisu Bay where protection is
offered by the surrounding hills of Hario Island.
4.3 TOPOGRAPHY
The outer harbor (Sasebo-Wan) is a large land-locked
bay, well protected by hills and mountains on all sides.
(See Figure 6). Major peaks to the west rise to 7$$ ft. To
the north, the bay is protected by a 1,253 foot mountain and
to the northeast by a 1,£64 ft mountain. Along the eastern
side of the bay, elevations run from 200 to 604 ft, while
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India Basin can berth approximately eight large ships
alongside. In addition, there are seven fueling piers,
numerous mooring buoys with capacities up to 30,000 tons
and anchorages available in the bay. Major hull and
machinery repair work can also be accomplished. Appendix
B gives specifics on the harbor facilities available.
Figure 6b. Close-up view. of India Basin located at northern
part of Sasebo inner harbor.
- 25 -

5. TROPICAL CYCLONES AFFECTING SASEBO
5.1 CLIMATOLOGY
Climatology indicates that the Island of Kyushu has
been affected by tropical cyclones from April through
December. However, the majority of the severe tropical
cyclones that pose a threat to Sasebo (any tropical cyclone
approaching within 1&0 n mi is considered a "threat") occur
during the months of June-October.
. Figure 7 gives the monthly summary by five-day periods
of "threat" tropical cyclones. Seventy-three tropical cy-
clones threatened Sasebo during the twenty-six year period,
1947-1973, an average of 2.8 per year. The peak threat per-
iod is August, followed by July and September. Sixty-eight
percent of the "threat" tropical cyclones had a northeasterly
direction of movement prior to their closest point of ap-
proach (CPA) to Sasebo and, therefore, can be classified as
"recurvers" . Figure 7 also indicates that during June and
October, 100 percent of the "threat" tropical cyclones were
"recurvers", followed by September (37$) » August (65$) and
July (29$). Since the majority of "threat" tropical cyclones
are recurvers, the reader may find it worthwhile to review
the characteristics of recurving tropical cyclones (See
Figure 1, Section 2.3).
Figure 8 displays the "threat" tropical cyclones accord-
ing to the compass octant from which they entered the 1$0 n
mi radius threat area. The circled numbers indicate the
- 26 -

Figure 7. Frequency distribution of the number of tropical
cyclones that passed within 1&0 n mi of Sasebo. Subtotals
. are based on 5-day periods, for tropical cyclones that oc-
curred during 1947-1973- Shaded area indicates the number





Figure 3. Directions from which tropical cyclones entered
threat area (a lBO n mi radius circle centered at Sasebo)
during the period, 1947-1953- Numbers circled indicate
the number of tropical cyclones that entered from each




total that entered from an individual octant. The adjacent
numbers express this as a percentage. It is evident that
the. majority of tropical cyclones (66%) entered the threat
area from a sector extending from SW to SE.
Table 1 indicates that out of the 73 "threat" tropical
cyclones during the years 1947-1973* 57 percent passed Sasebo
to the east, 37 percent passed Sasebo to the west and 6 per-
cent dissipated southwest of Sasebo. The fact that the
majority of "threat" tropical cyclones pass to the east, im-
plies that Sasebo is placed in the left or "navigable" semi-
circle where the wind and seas are less in intensity.
Table 1. "Threat" tropical cyclones passage
relative to Sasebo (1947-1973).
Month JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT TOTAL
Passed east of Sasebo 6 6 14 11 5 42




An overall statistical summary of the tropical cyclone
climatology for the years 1947-1973 is provided in Figures
9 to 13. This summary is based on tropical cyclone tracks
3
grouped by month, June through October. Since the tracks
-Trom Chin, 1972 for years 1947-1970, and from Annual
Typhoon Reports for 1971-1973 (FWC/JTWC).
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N « NUMBER OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THIS
SQUARE FOR THE MONTH
Li= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI (1°LAT)
L 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE CF 180 N MI (3°LAT)
Rl= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI (1°LAT)
R 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
Sc FROM SASE30 WITHIN A DISTANCE OF ISO N MI ;3°LAT)
RAO » PERCENT OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THE
SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED WITHIN 180 N MI OF
SASEBO
FOR THE MONTH OF:
JUN (31 MAY _ 29 JUN)
Figure 9. Statistical summary of tropical cyclone tracks
that passed within 180 n mi of Sasebo for the month of
June. (Based on data from Chin, 1972 and FWC/JTV/C









N « NUMBER OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THIS
SQUARE FOR THE MONTH
Lj = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE Or 60 N MI (l°LAT)
L 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENGING
NW FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE OF ISO N MI (3°LAT)
Rl= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI (TLAT)
R3= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASS C D THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3°LAT)
RAD = PERCENT OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THE
SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED WITHIN 180 N MI OF
SASEBO
FOR THE MONTH OF:
"JUL (3° JUN ~ 29 JUL)
Figure 10. Statistical summary of tropical cyclone tracks
that passed within ISO n mi of Sasebo for the month of












N - NUM3ER OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THIS
SQUARE FOR THEKONTH
ll« PERCENT OF ALL T?.0?ICA.L CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM SASE30 WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI (1°LAT)
L 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM SASE30 WITHIN A DISTANCE Or 180 N MI (3°LAT)
Rl= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 50 N MI (l'LAT)
R3* PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED ThROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM SASE30 WITnIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3"LAT)
RAO • PERCENT C~ TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THE
SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED WITHIN 130 H MI OF
SASEEO
FOR THE MONTH OF:
AUG (3 ° J UL- - 23 AUG)
Figure 11. Statistical summary of tropical cyclone tracks
that passed within 15v n mi of Sasebo for the month of
August. (Based on data from Chin. 1972, and FWC/JTWC










N = NUMBER OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THIS
SQUARE FOR THE MONTH
Li = PERCENT Of AL.L TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI (1°LAT)
L 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
HW FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3°LAT)
R] = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DTSTANCE OF 60 N MI (1"LAT)
R 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE OF ISO N MI (3°LAT)
RAD * PERCENT OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THE
SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED WITHIN 180 N MI OF
SASEBO
FOR THE MONTH OF:
SEP (29 AUG - 27 SEP)
Figure 12. Statistical summary of tropical cyclone tracks
that par.sed within ISO n mi of Sasebo for the month of
September. (Based on data from Chin, 1972, and FWC/JTWC






N > NUMSER OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THIS
SQUARE FOR THE KOHTH
L
t
= PERCENT or ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM SASE30 WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 'I MI (PLAT)
L 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM SASEBO WITHIN A OISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3°LAT)
Rl= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI (]°LAT)
R 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FRCM SASEBO WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3°LAT)
RAD * PERCENT OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THE
SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED WITHIN 180 N M! OF
SASEEC
FOR THE MONTh OF:
OCT (28 SEP - 27 OCT)
Figure 13. Statistical summary of tropical cyclone tracks
that passed within ISO n mi of Sasebo for the month of
October. (Based on data from Chin, 1972, and FWC/JTWC
Annual Typhoon Reports 1971-1973)
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were recorded for five-day periods, exact calendar months
could not be. used. To assess the threat to Sasebo, the
following parameters were used:
N: The total number of tropical cyclones that
passed through each 3 lat/long square for
a given month
RAD: The percent of those tropical cyclones that
passed through the square and subsequently
passed within 1$0 n mi of Sasebo
ft, : Percentage of all tropical cyclones that
passed through the square and subsequently
crossed a line extending 60 n mi southeast
of Sasebo (1 latitude)
R^: Percentage of all tropical cyclones that
passed through the square and subsequently
crossed a line extending l£0 n mi southeast
of Sasebo (3 latitude)
L-, : Percentage of all tropical cyclones that
passed through the square and subsequently
crossed a line extending 60 n mi northwest
of Sasebo (1 latitude)
Lot Percentage of all tropical cyclones that
passed through the square and subsequently
crossed a line extending lBO n mi northwest
of Sasebo (3 latitude).
- 3L -

N and RAD are printed on the top and bottom of the
square respectively. L-. and L^ are printed at the left, and
R., and R.-, at the right edges of the square.
For example, in Figure 9> the 3 degree square located
between 123E to 126E and 27N to 30N had 9 tropical cyclones
pass through it during the years 1947-1973. Of these, 67
percent approached within ISO n mi of Sasebo; 11 percent
passed within 60 n mi southeast and 22 percent within ISO n
mi to the southeast. Twenty-two percent of the storms passed
within 60 n mi to the northwest and 33 percent passed within
1&0 n mi to the northwest.
Figures 14 to 1$ represent an analysis of the RAD num-
ber from the above figures. The solid lines represent the
"percent threat" for any storm location. The dashed lines
represent approximate approach times to Sasebo, computed from
the average tropical cyclone speed of movement for June-
October from NAVAIR 50-1C-62. The average speeds are pre-
sented in Table 2. For example, in Figure 14 > a storm
located at 123E and 27N has a 60 percent probability of pass-
ing within 1$0 n mi of Sasebo, and it could reach Sasebo in
one day.
Note the significant shift in direction from which
"threat" tropical cyclones approach Sasebo (Figures 14 - IS).
In June, the "threat" is from the S; whereas in July, it is
from the SE. During August, the "threat" sector extends
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Figure 14. Percentage of tropical cyclones that passed
within 16*0 n mi of Sasebo for the month of June. (Based
on data from 1947-1973)
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Figure 15. Percentage of tropical cyclones that passed
within ISO n mi of Sasebo for the month of July. (Based
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Figure 16. Percentage of tropical cyclones that passed
within 1$0 n mi of Sasebo for the month of August (Based
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Figure 17. Percentage of tropical cyclones that passed
within ISO n mi of Sasebo for the month of September.
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Figure 1&. Percentage of tropical cyclones that passed
within 130 n mi of Sasebo for the month of October.
(Based on data from 1947-1973)
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Table 2. Average tropical cyclone speed
of movement in knots per 5 degrees
northern latitude for June-October,
JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT AVG
30-35 N 25 13 13 IS IS 17.4
25-30 N IS 12 10 14 15 13. S
20-25 N 11 11 10 12 13 11.4
15-20 N 10 10 10 11 11 10.4
5.2 WIND AND TOPOGRAPHICAL EFFECT
A total of 43 tropical cyclones approached within 1&0 n
mi of Sasebo in the fifteen-year period from 1959-1973 during
the months June-October. Table 3a groups the 43 tropical
cyclones according to the wind intensity that they produced
at Sasebo. Of the 43 tropical cyclones, 63 percent resulted
in strong winds (2 22 kt ) and 35 percent resulted in gale
force winds (> 34 kt).
Table 3a. Extent to which tropical cyclones
affected Sasebo during the period
June-October, 1959-1973.
Number of tropical cyclones that passed
within ISO n mi of Sasebo
43 fo
Number of tropical cyclones resulting
in strong (^ 22 kt ) winds in Sasebo 27 63/o
Number oi tropical cyclones resulting
in gale force ( Z. 34 kt ) winds in Sasebo 15
35/o
^From Chin (1972) for years 1959-1970 and from Annual
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Table 3b breaks down the "threat" tropical cyclones by
month and resulting wind intensity recorded at Sasebo. It
is. interesting to note that in September, out of seven tropi-
cal cyclones, six produced winds of gale force strength;
whereas, in August only eight out of 15 tropical cyclones
produced winds of the same intensity in Sasebo.
Table 3b. Extent to which the 43 tropical
cyclones from Table 3a affected
Sasebo during the period June -
October 1959-1973, by month.
Wind intensity
produced at Sasebo Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Total
Winds < 22 kt 2 6 5 2 1 16
Winds > 22 kt 2 2 15 7 1 27
Winds >34 kt 1 6 6 15
Figures 19 - 24 depict the tracks of the "threat" tropi-
cal cyclones during the fifteen-year period, 1959-1973.
Those resulting in gale force winds at Sasebo during the
months of June-October are indicated by a solid line.
"Threat" tropical cyclone tracks resulting in winds less
than 34 kt are depicted by a dashed line. From analysis of
the "threat" tropical cyclone tracks, (Figures 19 - 24) it
is apparent that those tropical cyclones that result in gales
at Sasebo, generally, fall into two categories: those that
passed east of Sasebo, and those that passed west of Sasebo.
This difference is the key factor in determining to what
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extent an individual tropical cyclone will affect Sasebo.
If the tropical cyclone path is to the east, across Kyushu,
the tropical cyclone will lose seme of its intensity through
interaction with the land. In addition, the Kyushu Mountains
(See Figure 4) will provide protection from the winds of the
tropical cyclone. An example of this was Typhoon Bess (Aug.
1963) which crossed Kyushu with a CPA of $0 n mi northeast
5
of Sasebo.
In the case of a tropical cyclone passing west of
Sasebo, the path is primarily over water. From Figures 4 -
6, it is evident that the protection offered by topography to
the south and west is much less than to the north and east of
Sasebo. In addition, tropical cyclone passage to the west
places Sasebo in the "dangerous" or right semicircle subject-
ing the harbor to higher wind velocities. An example of this
case was Typhoon Gilda (July 1974) 5 . The CPA of Typhoon
Gil da was to the west at approximately the same distance
(&0 n mi) as Typhoon Bess and both typhoons had center winds
of about the same intensity. However, Typhoon Gilda pro-
duced winds of 45 kt at Sasebo; whereas, Typhoon Bess re-
sulted in winds of 3$ kt at Sasebo.
It must be pointed out that all of the wind data evalua-
tions are based on the assumption that the "threat" tropical
• 5See Appendix E for case studies on Typhoon Bess (Aug,
1963) and Typhoon Olive (Aug. 1971) passing east of Sasebo
and Typhoon Gilda (July 1974) passing west of Sasebo.
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cyclone was solely responsible for the winds produced at
Sasebo. This assumption does not take into account other
extratropical synoptic features existing at the time which
could "bias" the winds observed in Sasebo.
Since all of the hourly wind data analyzed during the
fifteen-year period, 1959-1973, was provided by the Japanese
Weather Bureau, another "bias" in the wind data must be
pointed out. Figure 6 indicates the presence of a hill
south of the Japanese Weather Bureau. Since the anemometer
of the station does not extend above this hill, southerly
winds recorded at the Japanese Weather Bureau will be less
than actual winds experienced by ships in the harbor. This
fact is readily apparent when comparing the Japanese Weather
Bureau observations during Typhoon Gilda's passage west of
Sasebo to other observations (See Appendix E, Table El).
Figure 25 shows the position of tropical cyclone centers
when strong winds ( > 22 kt) were first and last recorded at
Sasebo. It is apparent that "threat" tropical cyclones, as
far away at 360 n mi, may generally produce winds > 22 kt in
Sasebo. Figure 26 shows tropical cyclone center positions
when gale force ( > 34 kt) winds were first and last re-
corded at Sasebo. It can be seen that winds > 34 kt gener-
ally do not begin until the storm is about 1&0 n mi away.
In analyzing Figures 25 and 26, one must keep in mind the
following: 1) a greater number of "threat" tropical cyclones
will pass to the east of Sasebo, and 2) the fact that a
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Figure 25. Positions of tropical cyclone centers when > 22 kt
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Figure 26. Positions of tropical cyclone centers when > 34 kt





The most severe threat to the harbor occurs when a
tropical cyclone approaches from the southwest and passes
west of Sasebo within 50 n mi. In this case, the elevations
of Hario Island serve as a good wind barrier for ships at
typhoon anchorage at Ebisu Bay. When tropical cyclones pass
to the east of Sasebo, the elevations to the north and east
of the harbor provide excellent protection. In this case,
maximum winds can be expected from NNE (See Figure 6).
In general, the winds experienced in Sasebo Harbor due
to the passage of a tropical cyclone will be approximately
one-half the intensity of the maximum center winds when pass-
ing to the east and somewhat greater than half when passing
to the west of Sasebo.
5.3 WAVE ACTION
Maximum wave action is associated with a typhoon pass-
ing to the west since this places Sasebo in the right or
"dangerous" semicircle of the typhoon. The greater relative
wind in this area generates waves which tend to be more
destructive. Because the shape of the harbor reduces the
fetch, and because of the relatively narrow harbor entrance,
the effects of the typhoon related winds and sea are mini-
mized. The maximum wave heights that can be expected with ty-
phoon strength winds ( > 64 kt) are 7 ft near India Basin
7
and 9 ft at typhoon anchorage.
U.S. Navy Fleet Weather Facility, Yokosuka, Japan,
1967: Typhoon Havens: Japan-Korea-Okinawa.
7Based on Forecasting Curves for Shallow-Water Waves
from U.S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Center, 1973:
Shore Protection Manual (Volume I J.
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5.4 STORM SURGE AND TIDES
When a tropical cyclone crosses a coastline, a rise in
water level may occur. This is caused by wind stress on the
water surface and the effects of atmospheric pressure reduc-
tion. Also tides may act to either increase or decrease
this rise in water level.
The storm surge effect is most evident in the shallow
waters of large inland bays open to the south coast of
8
Japan. The height of the storm surge in a given port is
dependent on the tropical cyclone track. If the track is to
the west of the port, the peak surge will be large; while
the opposite is true for a track to the east of the port.
Over a five-year period, during which 10 tropical cy-
clones passed to the west of Sasebo, the maximum tidal height
over. the normal tide was 1.3 feet. Since the tidal range for
Sasebo Harbor is 10 to 12 feet, this relatively small storm
surge would be significant only if it coincided with a high
Spring tide and large waves. These three factors did coin-
cide in July 1974 with the passage of Typhoon Gilda. Large
amounts of water were forced over the southern walls in both
Juliet and India Basins. However, even under these extreme
conditions, India Basin was considered a safe adequate haven
Miyazaki, M. , 1974: Characteristics of Storm Surges
Induced by Typhoons along the Japanese Coast.
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by the Commanding Officer of the U. S. Navy vessel berthed
.
o
at India Nos. 7 and 8 during Typhoon Gilda's passage.
Q




6. PREPARATION FOR HEAVY WEATHER
6.1 TROPICAL CYCLONE WARNINGS
It is essential to recognize that the approach of a ty-
phoon is usually signaled by the following indicators:
1. Heavy swell (in front and to the right of the
storm)
.
2. Greater than normal amounts of high cirrus clouds
known as "mackerel sky"
.
3. Irregular or pumping action of barometer followed
by a steady drop. The diurnal pressure variation
effect (high at 1000 and 2200 local time, low at
0400 and 1600 local time) must be kept in mind.
When the diurnal variation is no longer evident,
the storm is close.
Tropical cyclone warnings including 24-, 4$-> and 72-hr
forecasts are issued by the Fleet Weather Central/Joint Ty-
phoon Warning Center (FWC/JTWC), Guam. When the initial
warning of a tropical depression, storm or typhoon is re-
ceived, a running plot of the following should be maintained:
1. Ship's position.
2. Actual and forecast tropical cyclone center posi-
tion.
3. Areas of dangerous winds (30 kts and above).
Appendix 1 to Annex H of CINCPACFLT 0P0RD 201-(YR) describes
how to calculate the "Danger Area" of a tropical cyclone. A
copy of this pertinent section is included in Appendix C.
An average twenty-four hour forecast position error of
135 n mi is commonly used. Burroughs and Brand (1972)
showed that the average twenty-four hour forecast error for
10From CINCPACFLT 0P0RD 201, H-l-5.
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recurving typhoons is 141 n mi. For forecast positions veri-
fying after the point of recurvature, the error is increased
to 165 n mi. Since the majority of "threat" tropical cy-
clones are recurvers, it may be prudent to use a radius
greater than 135 n mi when determining the danger area.
The criteria for setting local heavy weather readiness condi-
tions are discussed in SOPA (ADMIN) Sasebo INST 5000.1 series.
Annex W of the instruction is reprinted in Appendix C.
6.2 REMAINING IN PORT
Remaining in port is the recommended course of action
for all ships except aircraft carriers. There are no re-
cords available of a large, modern aircraft carrier remain-
ing in Sasebo Harbor during the passage of a typhoon. Ty-
phoon anchorages may be too restrictive for an aircraft
carrier if many ships are present. Also, due to the large
"sail area" of a carrier, the effects of winds would be even
greater than that experienced by smaller ships (AR, AF, etc.).
In addition, suitable berthing is not available in the inner
harbor for an aircraft carrier during the passage of a
"threatening" tropical cyclone.
Commander Service Group THREE in SOPA (ADMIN) Sasebo
Instruction 5000.1 series makes the following statements
pertinent to the use of Sasebo as a typhoon haven:
"Because of local topography, Sasebo Harbor provides excel-
lent shelter during the passage of a typhoon to the east"
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"and good shelter during the passage of a typhoon directly-
over or close to the west. Mooring buoy capacities and
suitability of anchorages are adequate. Generally speaking,
Sasebo Harbor can be considered a typhoon haven for all but
the largest of naval ships."
Figures 27 - 32 show the tropical cyclone threat axis
for Sasebo from June-October. The dotted area of the arrow
represents a 30 percent or greater probability of a tropical
cyclone coming within 130 n mi (indicated by the hatched
circle) of Sasebo. In addition, an effort has been made to
indicate the most frequent direction of passage, east or
west of Sasebo, by displacing the center of the arrow in
the corresponding direction.
To correctly assess the threat posed by an approaching
tropical cyclone, the following timetable depicted in
Figures 27 - 31 was constructed:
I. An existing tropical cyclone, or potential
development, in area "A" with forecast move-
ment toward Kyushu:
a. Review the material condition of the ship
b. Reconsider all maintenance activities
scheduled to exceed 4& hours.
II. A tropical cyclone entering area "B" with fore-
cast movement toward Kyushu:
11




a. Reconsider all maintenance activities
scheduled to exceed 24 hours.
b. Prepare ship for heavy weather and move-
ment to typhoon anchorage.
III. A tropical cyclone entering area "C" with fore-
cast movement toward Sasebo:
a. Be prepared to move to typhoon anchorage.
b. Review availability of tugs, pusherboats.
c. Ensure sufficient power available to counter
high winds and seas by steaming to the anchor.
A review of Appendix E will provide the reader with an
understanding of the conditions which other ships have exper-
ienced during storm conditions at Sasebo Harbor. Even though
utilization of the typhoon anchorages in the southern part
of the harbor is preferred, several commanding officers have
noted that India Basin, especially Berths 8 and 9» is suit-
able for larger ships during the passage of a typhoon. Wet
drydocks to the west of India Basin provide excellent shel-
ter for small ships (MSC, ATF, etc.).
There have been only a few incidences where ships have
incurred damage from a typhoon while in Sasebo and generally
this resulted from ships parting their moorings due to
shackle failure. The use of "oversized" or "doubled-up"
shackles and steaming to the buoy are recommended. Another
possible problem during the passage of a typhoon is that the
mothballed LST's moored at Tategami could break loose and





Figure 27. Tropical cyclone threat axis "for the month of
June. The area within the arrow approximates a 30^ -or
greater probability of a tropical cyclone coming within
1&0 n mi of Sasebo (hatched area). Displacement of the
arrowhead center east or west of Sasebo indicates a
greater tendency for tropical cyclone passage on the
corresponding side. Approach times to Sasebo are based







Tropical cyclone threat axis for the month of
The area within the arrow approximates a 30^ or
Figure 2$
July.
greater probability of a tropical cyclone coming within
ISO n mi of Sasebo (hatched area). ' Displacement of the
arrowhead center east or west of Sasebo . indicates a
greater tendency for tropical cyclone passage on the
corresponding side. Approach times to Sasebo are based
on Table 2, Section 5.1.
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Figure 29. Tropical cyclone threat axis for the month ^of
August. The area within the arrow approximates a 3<> or
greater probability of a tropical cyclone coming withm
130 n mi of Sasebo (hatched area). Displacement of the
arrowhead center east or west of Sasebo indicates a
greater tendency for tropical cyclone passage on the
corresponding side. Approach times to Sasebo are based
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Figure 30. Tropical cyclone threat axis for the month of
.September. The area within the arrow approximates a 30$
or greater probability of a tropical cyclone coming "with-
in 1$0 n mi of Sasebo (hatched area). Displacement of the
arrowhead center east or west of Sasebo indicates a greater
tendency for tropical cyclone passage on the corresponding
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Figure 31. Tropical cyclone threat axis for the month of
October. The area within the arrow approximates a 30^ or
greater probability of a tropical cyclone coming within ISO
n mi of Sasebo (hatched area). Displacement of the arrow-
head center east or west of Sasebo indicates a greater
tendency for tropical cyclone passage on the corresponding





Evasion at sea is recommended only for aircraft carri-
ers. Since the waters near Sasebo Harbor are restricted,
evasion must commence early. To facilitate early action,
the following timetable (in conjunction with Figures 27-31)
has been established:
I. An existing tropical cyclone moves into or
development takes place in area "A" with
forecast movement toward Kyushu:
a. Review material condition of ship. A
sortie may be desirable 2-4 days hence.
b. Reconsider any maintenance that would
render the ship incapable of getting
underway within 4$ hours.
II. Tropical cyclone enters area "B" moving
toward Sasebo:
a. All ships begin planning course of action
to be taken if sortie should be ordered.
b. Reconsider any maintenance that would render
the ship incapable of getting underway with-
in 24 hours.
III. Tropical cyclone enters area "C" moving toward
Sasebo:
a. Execute sortie plans made in previous steps.
If possible, evasion to Yokosuka Harbor, a designated
aircraft carrier haven, should be considered first. Evasion
routes at sea may be developed by the use of Appendix A (the
mean tropical cyclone tracks, track limits, and average
speed of movements for the months June-October in conjunction
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with Figures 27 - 31 (tropical cyclone threat axis and ap-
proach times to Sasebo for the months June-October). In all
cases, Optimum Track Ship Routing (OTSR) should be consulted
as to the best evasion route.
In planning an evasion route, it must be noted that the
Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea are re-
stricted by land masses and are frequented by tropical cy-
clones during 1 July - 10 September to make evasion to
those seas difficult. Also, destructive seas have been noted





The conclusion reached by this study is in full agree-
ment with the previous study by Fleet Weather Facility,
Yokosuka (1967) which considered Sasebo Harbor to be a favor-
able typhoon haven for all ships except aircraft carriers.
The following reasons were used in arriving at this conclu-
sion:
1. The harbor topography provides excellent protection
from winds out of the north or east and good protection from
southerly winds. However, due to the large "sail area" of a
carrier, winds may affect the ship severely.
2. The anchor holding action in the typhoon anchorage
is excellent.
3. There is sufficient maneuvering room while at ty-
phoon anchorage in the outer harbor. However, aircraft
carriers may be too restricted if many ships are present.
4. The inner harbor provides little protection for
aircraft carriers. Ships of the size of AR' s, AOE's, and
AF's can find good protection at India Basin, Berths & and
9. Small ships have excellent protection in wet drydocks.
5. Surge effect is minimal and wave action is not ex-
cessive during the passage of a typhoon.
6. Port services available are excellent.
To aid commanding officers in rapidly evaluating the
threat posed to Sasebo by an individual tropical cyclone, and
to aid in the decisions thereafter, Figure 32 has been in-



















TROPICAL CYCLONE DEVELOPMENT IN WESTPAC
To determine whether tropical cyclones will
or will not affect the area within 400 n mi of
Sasebo , refer to:
a. Section 6.1 (p. 56) which describes
tropical cyclone warning information. Examine
present warnings.
b. Monthly mean western North Pacific clima-
tological typhoon tracks in Appendix A (pp. 71-84).
c. Section 5 (pp. 26 - 55)-tropical cyclone
climatology for Sasebo. In particular. Figures 14-
18 (pp. 36-40), the percent threat analyses, and




}L CYCLONE WILL AFFECT THE
THIN 400 N MI OF SASEBO
determine whether the tropical
i will pose a threat (pass within
li) to the port refer to:
Section 6.1 (p. 56) which de-
; tropical cyclone warning informa-
ailable. Examine present warnings
ssued.
Figures 19-24 (pp. 42-47) the
of gale associated storms.
ire
L .MIL.lJ'^Tt^M
WILL NOT AFFECT SASEBO
BBBMH— Bill 1
Section 5.1 (pp. 26-35) and
2 (pp. 41-53) with emphasis
25 (p. 51) for the position
storm centers when >_ 22 kt
egan at Sasebo and Figure 26
for the position of past storm
when > 34 kt began at Sasebo.
TROPICAL CYCLONE WILL NOT AFFECT
THE AREA WITHIN 400 N MI OF SASEBO
Continue to monitor storm movement;






TROPICAL CYCLONE IS NOT A THREAT TO
SASEBO
Continue to monitor storm movement
be alert for significant changes.
" TO.S,THREAT, SASEBO
TROPICAL CYCLONE WILL POSE A THREAT TO SASEBO
REMAINING IN PORT
Tiaining in port _is the recommended procedure
r all ships except aircraft carriers. Refer
a. Section 6.2 (p. 57), "Remaining in
Port".
b. Section 4, "Sasebo" with emphasis
on harbor characteristics, Section
4.2 (p. 21), Topography, Section
4.3 (p. 23) and Harbor Facilities,
Section 4.4 (p. 25)
.
c. Appendix E (p. 105) especially
comments by commanding officers
while in port during typhoon passage.
EVASION
Evasion is not recommended" except
for aircraft carriers. Refer to:
a. Appendix A (p. 71), Mean
Western North Pacific Ty-
phoon Tracks.
b. Section 6.2 (p. 57) with em-
phasis on Figures 27-31 (p.
60-64).
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The mean typhoon tracks, track limits and average speed
of movements for the month of June and in ten-day periods
for July-October are depicted in Figures Al - A13. It must
be realized that storms deviate from the mean tracks, but
about &0-90 percent will fall within the track limits. The
use of these tracks should be of particular benefit in long
range (in excess of 48 hours) planning. The application of






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The following is a list of piers, buoys and other equip-









































* Mooring buoys are being removed/relocated. Fleet activi-
ties Sasebo will have up-to-date information on this.
TUGS
One 2,000 HP YTB
One 740 HP SSK
Two 540 HP SSK
One 1,200 HP YTM
One 960 HP YTM




















262' 82 f 30' LST 7 Ammunition dock

















40' 42' 2' ' X g' NSFO
40' 41' 2' ' X g" NSFO
1' ' X 6» ' MOGAS
1' 1 X 6' ' DFM
1' ' X 6' 1 AVGAS
39' 47' 4' ' X g' NSFO
g» ' X g« ' JP-4
4' ' X g' Multi
34' 42 • 4' ' X g' MOGAS
1' ' X g« NSFO
5' ' X g' ' Multi
32 f 40' 4' ' X g' ' NSFO
4' ' X g' Multi
31' 39' 3' 1 X g' DFM
3' 1 X g' JP-5
5' 1 X g» ' JP-5
20» 23' 1' 1 X 6' ' DFM
45' 4g f 6' 1 X g' NSFO
4' 1 X g» AVGAS
4' ' X g» JP-5
HANDLING EQUIPMENT . Several floating and rail mounted
cranes are available from Sasebo Heavy Industries (SSK) with















7.5 tons to 50 tons
Notes
USN at India







Name Length Width Depth Capacity Height Notes
No. 1 514' 37' 42' 3,000 GT _ Two mobile cranes
No. 2 106' 107' 47' 26,000 GT — USN
No. 3 1,214' 230' 49' 130,000 GT — Two 15 ton cranes
No. 4 1,115 163' 54' 30,000 GT — Four 20 to
ton cranes
60
No. 5 464' 99' 33' 6,000 GT — One 20 ton crane




Calculating the danger area (from CINCPACFLT OPORD





^^i2ii_^TO ANNEX H Operation OrderCIN'CPACFLT No. 201
average jSn^lg^^aSg^^ 2fnou^ ^T ^^ -'improving, thestatistics over past y~ars is about lit £?? typhoor forecast error, derived fro-by the Joint Tvohoon Wa-nina Center t~Z *' Tro -°ical cyclone warnings issued"
Pheral winds greater than 50 SSts and greater SS*S ? J-r forecast! of perl-a tropical cyclone. Should conditions If fetch ^2 *° X^ "£** assoc^ted withare capable of producing a fullv ar?I^n L ^ duratlon obtain, 30 knot winds
ectness of center position repots and tne f^^T3 ?P J 28 feat ' Ths ""^erratic track have led to ^Jlt^t^ **??
^
at a typhoon often follows anth- evolution «f « f - Y?'-00"




As each new warning is received;
(a) Mark the reported center position of the tropical cylone.
(b) Mark the 24 hour forecast center position of the cyclone.






adius of 135 miles draw a circle around the forecast cent-rs will enclose a locus area of possible 24 hour center positions/
-
(e) Extract the 24 hour forecast for winds greater than 30 knot^ For
the im^s ii?ss SLS^^isr^.s'SL1;? ^ts^^yPlacing the center of the south oriented wind pattern along the p£Liter*of the24 hour locus of possible center locations. A practical aporoxiLtion would beSimply to add 135 miles to the forecasted wind radii. "" ' °U °G
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.: 30 Knots within the next ^^^^,^^^^^^^"^ in ,ce3s
<h) ^CALCULATE THE DMIGZH AREA KITH EACH ?:;H KAaXING RECEIVT^ '
(3) Estimating Danger Area.
(a) Locating the shio rplaHuo *-,-» +.V,-. j
t initiate evasion%rocedurSs is a conttnutn- * ^f^ &nd navi5able semicircles
te typhoon's forecast movent"ay co" ?h ^ Vision and updating of
si? to typhoon center. Kh-n still SS? ?^S c anSe the spatial relationship of
ec.fully plotting each ne.^g,^S^SSS^^ l^LT^^K
I 12erou5 once the ship TTToSaWSithin th~ a AJ C^i^-£^£i^£rcii_^<tre^ lvdelated with the typhoon. 3 rea ° r Sweater tnan 30 knots wincT^
(b) In event that the eppfpr nn<;in nn «p -, *.
1 direction can be estimated as foxl^s?
-Face tte\i^^^.MtWa 'Im center is then 100 to 130 degrees to you? rich- » ?* ^ ^f^9 ° f the
ger allowance xn degrees should be made in the rear of a t^SoS^JS iftoe"
L precipitate^^^^l?l^^^^^ -turn




aS°n ^ established methods of maneuvering in Se vtcinLv ofT^S*"at not be ignored. y i inity r a typhoon
8h
e
:.?jd^ 0ut^ a lYPhoon. When impossible to avoid the tyohoon associated 30winds sanaard rules serve as a guide. These deoend on the ship"!^*Sf*fSOLtion wlth relation to the track of the typhoon. Position wit? resL^S *'moon Circulation depicted ideally in Tab can b- e £° d"o I t? tRB
Kll f°
Sltl0n With res^ct ^0 the forecast track an! da^efar^Soiccld'in
1, *.
(1) V7hen on Track of Typhoon
.
If the barometer continue to *-n =^ #-•'
1 dih
reCt;°n reruains constant or veers clockwise slowlv and increase L J"? *"*|, t e ship is on or near the track of the typhoon. In th*s cale b"" tStil to the starboard quarter, note the course, hold it and rur fo !• "^ 9 \, ,circle. As long as the wind direction remains conJta^t or v2rs^L/?J S| is in the Path of the storm., vrnen the wind has Hotel





"hen in Dangerous Semicircle
. If the ship is in th- dan-ro-s *^pie, bring tne wind on the starboard bow and hold it there?%ake at
-!~h Sav
>
he condition of the sea will allow. While main^ai-ina t^s c^r.I ' ~ JI log carefully. if the wind veers (clock-wiseK it1&±Stes^h"'v«^




when In the "Navigable " Semicircle. If it is estimated M1S f rto ev;
f™




senicircle. if this course is held, tSe tyohlon wiifoSsfa. However, if the wind starts to veer (clock-wise) it reanVtha" vou a?* L*3rous semicircle rather than the "navigale" semicircle a-d^L ™™ t -,








1. This plan establishes typhoon readiness doctrine and procedures for
other hazards of nature or disaster and specifies minimum standards of
safety to be observed by all ships present in Sasebo.
2. Basic Instructions .
a. Because of local topography Sasebo harbor provides excellent
shelter during the passage of a typhoon to the east and good shelter
during passage of a typhoon directly over or close to the west. Mooring
buoy capacities and suitability of anchorages are adequate. Generally
speaking, Sasebo harbor can be considered a typhoon haven for all but
the largest of naval ships. The waters near Sasebo are so restricted
that evasion by sorties must be commenced early.
b. Ordinarily SOPA will not order a general sortie from the harbor.
CVA Task Groups usually sortie as a SEVENTH Fleet Task Group. Minecraft
and towing and salvage types are much safer in port. Consequently SOPA' '
Sasebo Typhoon Evasion Plans call for CVA Task Groups to act at the "
discretion of their commander and for small craft to remain in port. A
sortie plan for other types will be promulgated when' Typhoon Condition
III is set. Task Group 96.6 organization assignments will be made to
CVA/CVS/Minecraf t/Tug types only when so requested,
c. The publication "Typhoon Havens Japan-Korea-Okinawa" produced
by FLEWEAFAC Yokosuka in July 1967 provides background data for Sasebo
Harbor,
d. Typhoon Evasion Plan.
(1) Upon sortie the Sasebo Typhoon Evasion Group Commander will
originate a departure message to COMNAVFORJAPAN, information COMSEVENTHFLT
SOPA and appropriate operational commanders, listing ships which have
sortied in company, indicating point and time of departure plus antici-
pated track.
(2) Typhoon Evasion Groups and single ships departing to evade
will advise COMNAVFORJAPAN, information to COMSEVENTHFLT, SOPA, and
operation commander, of any significant changes in track specified in
paragraph (1) . If within the critical area, make reports directed in
subparagraph 10. l». of Annex W.
(3) Make weather reports in accordance with COMSEVENTHFLT 0P0RD
201-YR, Annex W.
(A) Evasion Group/Unit Commanders and commanding officers of
ships which have sortied singly shall report their return to port to






(a) CTG 96.6, Evasion Group, Sasebo, SOPA Sasebo.
(b) TU 96,6, Large Auxiliary/Amphibious types/Senior unit
commander/commanding of f icer„
(c) TU 96.6.2, Carriers/Cruisers."
(d) TU 96.6,3, Minecraf t/Towing and Salvage Types. **
* These units normally enter as part of a permanent task group and
maintain their identity as such. Therefore, a 96.6 designator will
only be assigned them upon request.
** These units will normally remain in port. Therefore, evasion task
designators will be assigned only on request.
(6) Above evasion plan and task organization is always effective
for planning and will be implemented on signal by SOPA Sasebo.
e » Merchan t Ships. Commander - Fleet Activities, as a matter of normal
procedure, shall establish liaison with all merchant ships present and
advise then of the nature of this plan
f , Commanding Off icers^ Perogatives. Nothing in this plan shall be
conscrued as abridging the right of a commanding officer to take action
which he considers necessary to ensure the security of his command.
3. S torm Types.
a, Typhoonsand Tropical Storms . Typhoons have been observed during
each month of the year in the Western Pacific; those affecting Kyushu
have in most cases occurred during the period 1 June to 1 December.
k° Storms and Gales „ During the period from 1 October until 1 July,
extra-tropical cyclones frequently move across Kyushu, Their approach is
heralded by increasing southerly winds and as the associated cold front
passes, a rapid wind shift to the north occurs accompanied by strong
gusts sometimes reaching 65 knots.
c. Other Hazards of Na ture or Disaster. Hazards of nature such as
tidal waves, earthquakes, floods, seismic warnings, and other disasters
will be dealt with on a case basis when occurring.
d„ References o More detailed information regarding these weather
types may be found in Eowditch's Practical Navigator and in Knight's
Modern^SeananshiD, Typhoon evasion techniques are thoroughly discussed
in Chapter II, PACFLT Supplement ill to Shipboard Procedures (NWP 50A)
,





»• Small Cra ft Warning. COMFLEACTS Sasebo will transmit the following
message when winds of twenty knots occur in the harbor and when other
weather conditions in the harbor make small boating hazardous:
"SMALL CRAFT WARNING COMMENCING . ANNEX W PARA 4 OF SOPA
INST APPLIES".
a. Upon receipt of the above message, commanding officers of ships
present will ensure that untended boats and barges alongside are secured
to meet existing weather conditions. Small" boats- will be operated with
caution and loads reduced. Use only LCM and larger types when possible.
Boat officers and adequate life jackets will be provided. Commanding
officers of ships in the stream in granting liberty should give consider-
ation to the possibility that increasing inclemency in weather could result
in the cancellation of all small boating. When the small craft warning is
hauled down, SOPA (ADMIN) will cancel the' foregoing message.
5
.
Typhoon Cond i tions of Readiness Defined .
a. Typhoon Condition of Readiness IV . Typhoon Winds are possible
within 72 hours This condition is to be set each year without further
orders from 1 June until 30 November and will be ordered at other times
when a typhoon occurs.
b. Typhoon Condition of
_
Readiness III . Sustained winds of fifty knots
or more and/or gusts of sixty-five knots are probable within forty-eight
hours. Even though the wind velocity mentioned above may not be forecast
by the current typhoon advisory, this condition of readiness may be set
when evaluation of all factors indicates the desirability of taking
certain precautionary measures within Sasebo harbor.
c. Typhoon Condi tion of Readiness II . Sustained winds of fifty knots
or more and/or gusts to sixty-five knots are probable within twenty-four
hours.
i
d„ Typhoon Condition of Readiness I. Sustained winds of fifty knots
or more and/or gusts to sixty-five knots are probable within twelve hours,
6. Action Required of All Ships .
a. Typhoon Condition of Readiness IV .
(1) Be prepared to take action required under higher conditions
of readiness.
k • Typhoon Condition of Readiness III .
(1) Set a continuous watch on the harbor warning net, if not
already set.





(3) Ships disabled, due to overhaul of machinery or upkeep,
immediately commence to put engineering plant in operational condition
and make the ship seaworthy. Ensure reports required by this Annex
have been made.
(A) Towing and Salvage types remain in a readiness condition to •
assist other ships as may be required.
(5) All commanding officers, unit commanders, and Commander
Fleet Activities, Sasebo will normally be directed to attend a typhoon
conference during the early stages of Condition III. The following
information will be required of each commanding officer attending:
(a) Ability to get underway.
(b) Per cent of fuel capacity aboard.
(c) Material deficiencies affecting capability, if any.
(d) Ships in India Basin may be ordered to proceed to
assigned typhoon moorings.
c. Typhoon Condition of r .liness II .
(1) Set a continuous watch on fleet common net, in addition to
harbor warning net.
(2) SOPA Sasebo will assume net control of harbor warning net
and fleet common net,
(3) Suspend liberty and recall liberty parties,
(4) Secure topsides and set appropriate watertight integrity
condition decks.
(5) Raise steam and be prepared to get underway on four hours
notice, or as ordered. Ships not able to get underway within four
hours report by message to COMFLEACTS, Sasebo.
(6) Break up nest and proceed to berths assigned by COMFLEACTS,
Sasebo. Whenever possible, ships will be moved to individual buoys or at
least not more than two (2) DD or smaller to a buoy. Sides of all tenders
will be cleared.
(7) If alongside piers, put out extra hawsers and tend lines to
allow for changes in the height of the water. If practicable, lead
anchor chain out and secure it to shore.
(8) Hoist in all small boats not required for essential boating.
Small boats which cannot be accommodated aboard will be sent to FLEACTS,





(9) Proceed to berth and buoy assignments as assigned by
COMFLEACTS, Sasebo.
(10) Towing and Salvage types remain in a readiness condition to
assist other ships as may be required.
d, Typhoon Condition of Readiness I .
(1) SOPA Sasebo will conduct radio checks every half hour on the
harbor warning net and the fleet common net with all ships and stations
on these circuits. SOPA will also conduct radio checks every half hour
on the tug circuit.
(2) Expedite the completion of requirements of Conditions III
and II if not already accomplished.
(3) Station the special sea and anchor details and steaming
watches. Be ready to sortie if directed by SOPA,
(A) Execute heavy weather bills. Take additional precautions as
deemed necessary such as steaming to anchor or buoy.
(5) It has been found helpful for ships riding at anchor or moored
to a buoy during a storm to station an experienced officer in the eyes of
the ship where he can advise the bridge as to the proper orders to the
engine room to minimize surging against the chain.





Typhoon Condi-L ion of Readiness IV .
(1) Be prepared to implement action required under higher condi-
tions of readiness.
b. Typhoon Condition of Readiness III.
(1) Prepare shore and harbor installations for the storm, Make
preparations to evacuate non-essential personnel to safe areas or
shelters.
(2) Report to SOPA any unusual characteristics of merchant ships
present which tend to impair their heavy weather seaworthiness (underway,
berthed, or buoyed),
(3) Assign the mooring buoys and anchorages to be used by ships
present and capable of maneuvering if Condition II is set. Particular
attention is directed to consideration of safe scope and swinging radius
and capability of buoy moorings to resist dragging. Utilize to the





and vessels not able to maneuver or which are unseaworthy. Commanding
officers utilizing Navy controlled drydocks for their snail craft shall
provide crews for these craft who will be responsible for maintaining a
watch on the craft while in drydock. Final responsibility for the small
craft rests with the commanding officer, since there are normally many
craft berthed in the drydock and only a small number of shore based
personnel are present at the drydocks. Insofar as practicable, commanding
officers' desires concerning assignment to buoy or anchorage will be
solicited. Buoy, anchorage, and berth assignments will be promulgated
in a single message addressed to all ships present, information to SOPA,
and all afloat: commanders present. Late arrivals will be assigned
individually, by message, information to SOPA.
(4) Alert harbor tugs for employment in assisting ships as required
and be prepared to assist in returning liberty parties.
c Typhoon Cond ition of Readiness II .
(1) Complete shore and harbor preparations commenced under
Condition III.,
(2) Assist ships in shifting berths as necessary.
(3) Be prepared to berth and mess small boat crews and liberty /
parties unable to return to their ships.
(4) Instruct the Provost Marshal and Senior Shore Patrol Officer
to direct personnel on shore leave or liberty to report immediately to
Fleet Activities, Personnel Office when unable to return to their own
command
.
d. Typhoon Condition of Readiness I .
(1) Expedite completion of the requirements of Conditions III
and II if not already accomplished. i
(2) Prepare for disaster conditions.
i
(3) Report to SOPA the accomplishment of the requirements of
.these conditions of readiness by merchant ships present.
(4) Station larger tugs at appropriate places in the harbor
to assist ships in need thereof.
8 C Typhoon Warning and Weather Advisories. Typhoon and tropical storm
warnings are broadcast with immediate precedence on all U.S. Navy circuits
guarded by Navy ships. Refer to Radio Weather Aids, Volume I, Section 4,





9, Merchant Shipping Present , Commander Fleet Activities will keep all
merchant ships advised of typhoon bulletins' and of the setting of typhoon
conditions of readiness. He will require that they take adequate pre-
cautions commensurate with the condition set. In particular, merchant
ships will be required to maintain sufficient personnel aboard to raise
steam, veer chain and take appropriate safety measures, He will advise
them if the Navy ships will sortie and ascertain the. intentions of the
merchantmen as to sortie.
10o Reports Required ,
a. When a Typhoon Condition of Readiness is ordered for Sasebo,
COMFLEACTS shall advise COMNAVFORJAPAN, information to SOPA, COMSEVEN-
THFLT and the operational commander of ships present, by immediate
message of:
(1) Names of all U.S. Navy ships in port capable of maneuvering
at sea.
(2) Names of all U.S. Navy ships in port not capable of maneu-
vering at sea.
(3) Names of all other" ships, including merchant ships, in port.
k« Critical Area Reports, Whenever storm conditions exist or are
forecast, a CRITICAL AREA is established in the storm area by the cog-
nizant Area Commander, This area is established to obtain information
regarding the status of ships within it, and to obtain weather reports
not otherwise available, Ships within this area shall report position,
course, speed and weater in accordance with COMSEVENTKFLT 0P0RD 201-YR
Annex W. , and as may be modified by the CRITICAL AREA MESSAGE. COM-
SEVENTHFLT and other interested commands will be included as information
addressees
,
11, Sample ^Messages - Typhoon Conditions of Readiness .




FROM: SOPA SASEBO, JAPAN
TO: (SHIPS PRESENT BY NAME) SASEBO JAPAN
INFO: COMFLEACTS, SASEBO, JAPAN
COMNAVFORJAPAN, Y0K0SUKA, JAPAN
COMSEVENTHFLT
SET TYPHOON CONDITION OF READINESS THREE FOR SASEBO HARBOR








FROM: SOPA SASEBO, JAPAN




A. SOPA S'ASEBOINST '5000.1' (SERIES)
1. THIS IS SOPA SASEBO EMERGENCY TYPHOON SORTIE PLAN.
2. COMPOSITION, COMMANDED EVASION GROUP AND CTG 96.6
IS
;






3. INSTRUCTIONS TG 96.6 'WILL SORTIE WHEN DIRECTED. SHIPS
UNABLE TO SORTIE WILL SHIFT TO SECURE BERTHS, AS DIRECTED
BY COMFLEACTS, SASEBO.
4. COMMUNICATIONS. IAW REF A.
BT
(3) SOPA will display the following signal indicating Typhoon
Condition III: "Code Emergency THREE".
i
b. Typhoon Condition II .
(1) SOPA Sasebo will transmit messages similar to the following:
(a) PRIORITY
UNCLAS
FROM: SOPA SASEBO," JAPAN
TO: (SHIPS PRESENT BY NAME) SASEBO JAPAN
INFO : COMFLEACTS , SASEBO , JAPAN
COMNAVFORJAPAN
COMSEVENTHFLT
SET TYPHOON CONDITION OF READINESS TWO FOR SASEBO
HARBOR AREA.
(2) SOPA will display the following signal indication Typhoon







c. Typhoon Condition I .
(1) SOPA Sasebo will transmit a message similar to the following:
(a) IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS
FROM: SOPA SASEBO, JAPAN*
TO: (SHIPS PRESENT BY NAME) SASEBO, JAPAN
INFO: COMFLEACTS SASE30 JAPAN
COMNAVFORJAPAN
COMSEVENTHFLT
SET TYPHOON CONDITION OF READINESS ONE FOR SASEBO HARBOR
AREA.
(b) SOPA will display the follox^ing signal indicating Typhoon
Condition I: "Code Emergency ONE".
d. When Typhoon danger has passed and Condition Readiness can be
relaxed SOPA will transmit a message similar to the following:
(1) ROUTINE
UNCLAS
FROM: SOPA SASEBO, JAPAN




SET TYPHOON CONDITION OF READINESS FOUR FOR SASEBO HARBOR





SHIPS SPEED VS. WIND AND SEA STATE CHARTS
Figures D-l and D-2 represent the estimated resultant
speed-of-advance of a ship in a given sea condition. The
original relationships were based on data of speed versus
sea state obtained from studies of many ships by James,
1957. They should not be regarded as truly representative
of any particular ship (Nagle, 1972).
For example, from Figure D-l, for a ship making 15 kt
encountering waves of 16 ft approaching 030 (relative to
the ship's heading) one can expect the speed-of-advance to
be slowed to about 9 kt. Twenty foot seas, under the same
conditon, would result in a speed-of-advance of slightly less
than 6 kt. However, it is emphasized that these figures are
averages and the true values will vary slightly from ship to
ship.
Figure D-3 shows the engine speed required to offset
selected wind velocities for various ship types (computed
for normal loading conditions).
- 101 -
































SHI? SPEED IH Iknots)
Figure D-l. Ship ^peed as a function of wave height and wave










































Figure D-2. Ship speed as a function of wave height and wave




THE CURVES SHOWS WERE DEVELOPED USING THE BASIC FORMULA:
WIND LOAD" R.AV*
WHERE Rw IS EQUAL TO WIND FRICTION FACTOR. (R. IS GENERALLY TAKEN AS 0.004.)
V IS EQUAL TO WIND VELOCITY IN KNOTS.
A IS EQUAL TO PROJECTED AREA ABOVE THE WATERL1NE. IN SQ.FT.
THREE SETS OF CALCULATIONS WITH VARYING R„ WERE USED. THE PLOTTED VALUES
ILLUSTRATED REPRESENT THE MEAN OF THESE VALUES.
—J"
Figure D-3. Engine speed vs. wind velocity for offsetting




Case studies on Typhoon Bess (9 Aug 1963), Typhoon Olive (5
August 1971) and Typhoon Gilda (6 July 1974).
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Typhoon Bess (9 August 1963).
a. Narrative:
On 27 July 1963 at 06Z, warning number one was is-
sued by FWC/JTWC , Guam, on Tropical Depression #20, located
about 75 n mi southwest of Guam with maximum winds of 2 5 kt
(See Figure E-l for Best Track of Typhoon Bess). After mov-
ing northward to a position about 200 n mi northwest of
Saipan it was upgraded to become Typhoon Bess on 30 July at
00Z. Bess followed an unusual path for the next five days,
first heading northward, then westward, then towards the
southwest, west and finally northwest. By 00Z on 4 August,
with 90 kt of wind near the center, Typhoon Bess started to
follow a sinusoidal path toward Kyushu. In its transit
toward southern Japan, the storm attained maximum winds up
to 130 kt. At 03Z on 9 August, the center of Typhoon Bess
moved inland near Nobeoka on the east coast of Kyushu with
center winds of 100 kt. As it crossed the land area,
Typhoon Bess decreased in intensity and was downgraded to a
tropical storm at 12Z on 9 August with maximum sustained
winds of 60 kt. Bess moved along the northeastern side of
the island of Kyushu, and was located near Fukuoka on the
southern part of the Sea of Japan at about 16Z on 9 August.
This storm passed approximately 65 n mi to the
northeast of Sasebo at CPA. The maximum hourly wind re-
corded by a meteorological unit at Sasebo during the passage
was 3$ kt; the maximum gust registered was 6l kt. There were
- 106 -
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Figure E-2
. Berthing diagram of U.S. naval vessels in Sasebo
Harbor during the passage of Typhoon Bess.
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16 commissioned U.S. naval vessels at Sasebo during the
passage of this storm, ranging in size from Coastal Mine-
sweeper to Repair Ship. Their berthing diagram is indicated
in Figure E-2. Four minecraft were berthed in wet drydocks;
eleven ships were moored to buoys, and the Repair Ship was
located at the typhoon anchorage.
b. Winds recorded at Japanese Maritime Self-Defense
Force Office, Sasebo, during passage of Typhoon Bess, August
1963:
DAY/TIME (Z) DIRECTION VELOCITY (KT) PEAK GUST (KT)
OS/12 NNE 20 32
13 NNE 20 36
14 "NNE 22 40
15 NNE 20 3S
16 NNE IS 26
17 NNE 22 40
IS NNE IS 30
19 NNE IS 22
20 NNE IS 30
21 NNE 20 36
22 NNE 16 22
23 N 2S 42
09/00 NNE 20 42
01 N 26 43
02 N 2S 50
03 N 30 4S
04 N 30 50
0S/05 N 3S 61 Max
Velocity &
Gust





DAY/TIME (Z) DIRECTION VELOCITY (KT) PEAK GUST (KT)
OS/OS N 24 43
09 N 20 44 .
10 N 20 40
11 NNW 20 34
12 N 20 3*
c. Comments by personnel and units involved:
(1) Reports from ships:
SHIP BERTH REMARKS
ALBATROSS (MSC-239) Buoy X-l
COMSTOCK (LSD-19) Buoy 1$
COMORANT (MSC-122) Drydock 3
GUNSTON HALL (LSD-5) Buoy 6
EPPING FOREST (MCS-7) Buoy 17
GANNET (MSC-290) Buoy X-2
HECTOR (AR-7) Anchorage 39
HENRICO (APA-45) Buoy 19
PEACOCK (MSC-193) Drydock 1
Satisfactory for MSC type
although wet drydock more
suitable.
Berth adequate.
Drydock number 3 highly
favorable. Problems none.




No problems. Berth satis-
factory.
Satisfactory.
Anchored in 15 fathoms.
With 105 fathoms to port
anchor. Severe yawing en-
countered in winds over
40 knots. Require addition-
al anchor under foot. Berth
adequate.
No problems experienced at
Buoy 19. Anchor dropped to
reduce yaw and steam used
on occasions to reduce
strain on chain. Consider
berth highly satisfactory.




PHOEBE (MSC-199) Buoy 1
VIREO (MSC-205) Drydock 1
WARBLER (MSC-206) Buoy 3
WASHBURN (AKA-108) Buoy 16
WHIPPOORWILL (MSC-207) Buoy 7





and suitable for typhoon.
Experienced great deal of
yaw despite use of rudder
and anchor underfoot. Con-
sider this inherent in MSC
type vessels.
Wet dock - no problems.
Stability excellent. Highly
recommended for MSC typhoon
berth.
At mooring buoy 3 with 45
fathoms of chain to the buoy,
placed ships stern within 50
yards of the MINOIRISE buoy
during high winds.
Buoy 16 considered suitable
typhoon berth utilizing
anchor underfoot to prevent
yawing and steaming to buoy
as necessary to ease strain
on buoy mooring.
Utilized 60 fathoms of chain
to Buoy 7 with anchor under-
foot to 12 fathoms at height
of storm. Biggest problem
yawing SO degrees either side
of wind. Anchor reduced yaw-
ing slightly. Less than 60
fathoms of chain to buoy
caused excessive strain as
chain cleared water. Buoy 7
satisfactory for typhoon but
seemed to experience more
wind than other MSC mooring.
Drydock 3 highly favorable.
Problems none. Very safe ty-
phoon berth.
Mooring satisfactory, suit-




(2) Comments by Operations Officer, Fleet Activi-
ties, Sasebo:
"Throughout the period of transit of Bess, our
Operations Department was manned continuously and repeated
wind observations were noted on our anemometer. With the
exception of one short gust to 47 kt in the morning, the
average winds were 30-35 kt and could not be considered of
typhoon velocity."
"By virtue of the fact that Bess passed to our
East, we were exposed to North and Northeasterly winds as
it approached. This fact also worked in our favor as the
harbor is sheltered on the North by a range of hills ex-
tending to 2000 ft in height."
d. Conclusions:
The following conclusions can be reached from this
case study:
1. All U.S. naval vessels considered Sasebo Harbor
as a safe typhoon haven during Typhoon Bess'
passage east of Sasebo. No damage was reported
by any of these ships.
2. Winds reported by ships in the harbor tended to
be higher than those reported by land based
units (maximum of k&) • Ships in the southern
part of the harbor at typhoon anchorage re-
ported winds near the maximum, while ships in
the northern part of the harbor reported winds
close to 40 kt.
3. The use of a second anchor dropped under foot
to reduce yawing, in addition to steaming to
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the anchor/mooring buoy to reduce the strain on
the chain are highly recommended.




Typhoon Olive (5 August 1971)
a. Narrative
Olive climaxed the most active July on record as
another in a succession of circulations in the equatorial
trough formed east of Guam on 24 July. After drifting over
Guam the system took a northward bend due to the influence
of a weak trough to the north. After commencing a northeast
drift, the circulation began to grow in size but did not be-
come better organized. By the 29th a rather complex cloud
system was in evidence as viewed by satellite. As the sub-
tropical ridge began to strengthen, the depression began to
slowly intensify and start an erratic, meandering westerly
track, reaching storm status early on the 31st. Switching
to a northwest direction, Tropical Storm Olive finally
achieved typhoon force by mid-day of the 2nd. The typhoon
reached her peak intensity of $5 kt some 4$ hours later as
she neared Yaku-Shima in the northern Ryukyus (Refer to
Figure E-5 for best track).
With the approach of a long-wave trough off the
coast of China, Typhoon Olive swung to a northerly track
with her center driving through western Kyushu east of
Nagasaki on the 5th. Crossing the Ryukyus, the highest
winds and lowest pressure were reported at the Japanese




Torrential rains measuring up to 59 •$ inches in the
mountainous regions of Kyushu (Ebino, Miyazaki prefecture)
accounted for numerous landslides and for 69 persons killed,
209 injured, and over 1,700 dwellings partly or completely
destroyed. At sea the 7,935-ton motorship KAMO MARU was
forced aground off Hesaki Lighthouse while the 975-ton
SHINMEI MARU ran aground six miles west of Anami-o-shima.
Weakened considerably by her traverse of Kyushu, Typhoon
Olive entered the Sea of Japan as a tropical storm and
paralleled the Korean coast before turning on a northeast
coast and becoming extratropical.
b. Comments by Commanding Officer, USS AJAX (AR6).
USS AJAX (AR6) was moored to berth India 8 at India
Basin with standard mooring lines doubled fore and aft with
a wire forward and hawser aft. The ship was in a "Cold Iron"
status on four hour notice for getting underway and in a C-l
equipment readiness status. At 0312351 Typhoon Condition
III was set in Sasebo Harbor in preparation for the typhoon.
AJAX ran out an extra wire forward and hawser aft at 0322301.
Wind conditions during the period and for the next 36 hours
remained relatively normal although the sky became progres-
sively clouded as the storm moved north over Kyushu. At
0500101 AJAX lighted fires under boilers #1 and #2 to in-
crease the ship's readiness for getting underway to 30 minute
standby. At 050440Z AJAX lighted fires under boilers #3 and
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Figure E-4. Berthing diagram of U.S. naval vessels in Sasebo
Harbor during the passage of Typhoon Olive.
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with occasional gusts to 8 kt. Wind direction steadied at
approximately 010 degrees (T) with the sky nearly completely
overcast. AJAX stationed the special sea and anchor details
in preparation for getting underway for anchorage.
At 20Z 4 August, Typhoon Condition II was set in Sasebo Har-
bor. By 2030Z Typhoon Condition I had been set with those
naval ships in India Basin moving out to anchorage. AJAX got
underway at 22 50Z for anchorage 35 in Sasebo Wan. The sky
remained overcast with broken clouds. Rain threatened al-
though it held off until later in the day. The ship was in
DEFCON Four throughout the entire period Typhoon Olive passed
over Kyushu. The AJAX diving boat was sent to FLTACTS Sasebo
boat pool to ride out the storm. This lessened the topside
weight and sail area available on AJAX. The ship proceeded
smoothly to anchorage 35 Sasebo Wan with pilot assistance
and anchored in 10 fathoms of water. Anchorage 35 has a mud
bottom and offered good holding properties for the anchor.
AJAX used only the stbd anchor with 90 fathoms of chain.
The engineering plant remained on 30 minute standby while at
anchor. As Typhoon Olive passed over Kyushu to the east of
Sasebo, the storm continued to diminish in strength. The eye
of the storm passed by Sasebo at 00Z on 5 August traveling
due north at S kt with maximum sustained winds at 65 kt. At
03Z Olive passed along the northeastern side of Kyushu near
Fukuoka and moved into the Sea of Japan and was downgraded
to a tropical storm.
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SOPA set Typhoon Condition IV at 06Z on 5 August and
AJAX waited for the winds to die down before proceeding back
to India Basin. By 09Z the worst of the winds passed and
the storm diminished in strength. AJAX remained at anchor
throughout the night under clear skies and proceeded to get
underway at 2130Z for India Basin. At 2245Z, AJAX moored
to berth India £, India Basin.
This storm passed approximately 50 miles to the east of
Sasebo. The maximum hourly wind velocity recorded by AJAX
while in anchorage 35 was 43 knots with maximum gust up to
45 knots. Typhoon Condition I was set at 2030Z on 4 August
by SOPA. Two other U.S. naval vessels were present in India
Basin, the USS DURHAM (LKA-114) in India 6 and the USS TALUGA
(A0-62) in India 1. TULUGA was underway at 1930Z on 4
August for Buoy 19. USS QUAPAW (ATF-110) moored in India 9
was the only U.S. naval vessel to ride out the typhoon with-
in India Basin. AJAX rode out the typhoon easily on 90 fath-
oms of chain. During maximum wind velocity, the strain on
the anchor chain was moderate and the ship was not damaged
in any way.
Civilian ships belonging to SSK Shipyard moored within
India Basin at berths 4 and 5 and on the outer enclosure to
India Basin. They rode the storm out from those positions
with no apparent damage. The maximum wind within within
India Basin at the height of the storm was approximately 2 5
knots. No damage was reported from any of the U.S. naval
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ships and berthing in all cases was considered adequate. It
is felt that all U.S. naval ships present could have been
protected from Typhoon Olive at their assigned moorings with-
in India Basin.
NOTE: Comments from the commanding officers of the other
three U.S. naval vessels in port during Typhoon
Olive's passage east of Sasebo are not available.
b. The following Typhoon Olive wind observations were
recorded by USS AJAX:
DAY/TIME (Z) DIRECTION VELOCITY(KT) PEAK GUSTS (KT)
04/21 350° 5 8
22 000° 10 14
23 345° 15 18
05/00 340° 15 18
01 340° id 23
02 320° 22 24
03 275° 17 24
04 240° 21 22
05 232° 25 27
06 245° 25 28
07 246° 25 35
08 240° 43 45 MAX
09 220° 32 40 VELOCITYGUST
10 240° 25 30
11 215° IS 23
12 230° 13 —
c. Conclusions.
The following conclusions can be reached from this
case study:
1. Sasebo Harbor was found to be a safe typhoon
haven with no problems reported.
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2. India Basin could be used to provide shelter
for a typhoon passing to the east of Sasebo





Typhoon Gilda (6 July 1974)
a. narrative:
On 30 June 1974 at 06Z, warning number one was is-
sued by FV/C/JTWC, Guam on tropical depression #9, located
about 500 n mi southeast of Okinawa (See Figure E-5). With-
in 12 hours, tropical depression #9 was upgraded to become
Tropical Storm Gilda 560 n mi southeast of Okinawa. Moving
slowly westward thereafter, Tropical Storm Gilda was upgraded
to Typhoon Gilda at 00Z on 2 July. As a typhoon, Gilda
moved slowly to the north into the East China Sea passing
SO n mi west of Okinawa. She reached maximum intensity with
central winds of 95 kt at 1<3Z on 4 July while 390 n mi south-
southwest of Sasebo. At 12Z on 6 July Typhoon Gilda reached
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Figure E-5. Best Track of Typhoon Gilda.
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Figure E-6. Berthing diagrams of U.S. Navy vessels in Sasebo
Harbor during the passage of Typhoon Gilda.
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CPA to Sasebo of 75 n mi to the west-northwest with maximum
central winds of 60 kt. She was downgraded to a tropical
storm at this point. After CPA, Gilda continued to move
toward the north-northeast passing 20 n mi to the west of
Pusan, Korea, and into the Sea of Japan where she dissipated.
At CPA to Sasebo maximum sustained winds recorded were from
the south at 45 kt with maximum gusts of 70 kt in the outer
harbor. Two commissioned U.S. naval vessels were in port
during Gilda' s passage to the west of Sasebo. One was an-
chored at the typhoon anchorage and the other was berthed
at India 7 and & (See Figure E-6). No damage was reported
by these ships and the typhoon anchorage was reported satis-
factory while berths at India 7 and & was found to be good.
b. Wind Data:
Wind velocities observed during Gilda 1 s passage are
presented in Table E-l. Comparing the Japanese Weather
Bureau wind observations to observations taken by other
activities, it is apparent that the Japanese Weather Bureau
wind observations were considerably less than the rest. This
is due to their protected location in relation to the wind
direction.
c. Comments by personnel and units involved.
(1) Reports from ships:
Ship: USS WHITE PLAINS (AFS-4)
Berth: Anchorage 35 with 10 fathoms to a mud bottom.
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Wind: Max sustained wind 45 kt with gusts to 65 kt
170°-lS0° between 19Z - 23Z on 6 July with max
gusting at 1915Z at 70 kt.
Suitability of Berth: Satisfactory. Elevation of
Nishi-Sonogi Peninsula and Hario Island to south
served as relatively effective wind break. Condi-
tion of sea inside of Kogo-Saki (harbor entrance)
noticeably calmer than outside. Mud bottom pro-
vided excellent holding ground.
Remarks: Severe yawing experienced with winds over 35
kts. Steamed to the anchor at 3 kts for winds
up to 45 kt. Steamed at 6 kt during sustained
gusts of 65-70 kt. Used full rudder and 6 to S
kt to check swing at extremes of yaw excursions
during peak gusts. No heavy strain or dragging
experienced. Rudder relatively ineffective to
prevent yawing. Power bursts at yaw limits with
full rudder eased the strain on the anchor. Used
surface search, Pathfinder, and fire control
Radars to cross check visual fixes in order to
detect dragging during periods of reduced visi-
bility in heavy rain. All three radars provided
excellent fixes. Steamed two boilers and two
ship service generators to have full power avail-
able. Because of uncrowded conditions in harbor
was able to ride to 120 fathoms with 700 to 1000
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yds clearance on all other anchored vessels.
All vessels observed experienced considerable yaw-
ing during periods of high winds and peak gusts.
Used periods when winds between 30 and 45 kts to
provide opportunity for 00D' s to experience
characteristic of ship steaming to anchor to
ease strain.
Recommendations: Maintain at least two boilers and two
generators on the line to ensure power available
to counter high winds and seas and to reduce
strain on anchor. Limited visibility can be ex-
pected during heavy rain. All operational radars
including fire control radar should be utilized
to cross check position. Drop second anchor
underfoot to reduce yawing.
Remarks: Ref B concerning Sasebo as typhoon haven dur-
ing Typhoon Gilda found valid (Ref B is the 1967






Ship: USS SACRAMENTO (AOE-1)
On 6 July 1974, 0635Z, SACRAMENTO was located inside
India Basin (#7) with a light draft of 2 5 ft Fwd, 31 ft Aft
and a 36,000 ton displacement. Several other ships were
present in the basin including one super tanker, another
ship (Esso tanker) was moored outside the basin opposite to
India 1 which afforded her least protection of all ships in
the area of the basin. SACRAMENTO experienced very little
difficulty during Gilda's passage. The events experienced
by SACRAMENTO on 6 July 1974 and weather data obtained
follow:
At 1039, the ship shifted from berth India 1 to berth
India 7 and 8 in a cold iron status. The move was made with
the use of tugs YTM 415, YTB 77 and two LCM's. An addition-
al tug, the Kyushu Maru (SSK WB) with a 2200 HP engine, was
called on to assist in the move. The services of Kyushu
Maru provided an additional margin of safety as the force of
the wind (25 kt) made it difficult to position SACRAMENTO.
The direction of the wind was 140 degrees true, which pushed
the ship away from Berth 7 and 8. It is believed that a
greater amount of difficulty would have been experienced
had the move been delayed until afternoon.
Upon arrival at berth 7 and 8, the ship was moored port-
side, using a standard mooring with 8" nylon line. In addi-
tion, three breast lines (5" nylon) and two springlays
(1-7/&") were used. One breast line led from the bow, one
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from the fantail, and one from amidship. The springlays
were put over from the eye of the ship and from the stern.
The mooring proved to be more than satisfactory. The breast
lines from the bow and amidships were attached to bollards
next to the buildings, which created a hazard to vehicles
utilizing the road next to India 7 and 3. The hazard was
reduced by having strips of white rags secured to the lines
making the lines more visible to warn vehicle traffic away.
Wooden barricades were provided by port services as an
additional warning.
The ship's head while at India 7 and 8 was 160 degrees
true, which initially put the wind off the port bow. This
tended to push the bow away from the berth placing more
stress on Line One and the bow breast line. However, the
buildings located in the vicinity seem to provide some
shelter. After the winds increased in velocity and shifted
to the starboard bow the seas in the basin increased and be-
came confused. Their height increased to a maximum of about
5 ft. In fact, the only difficulty encountered was the re-
sult of the water rushing into the basin and piling up
against the basin wall aft of the ship creating a back wash
that moved between the ship and the dock. This caused the
camels to shift forward and dislodge from between the ship
and the dock. The camels were moved back into position by
using the cargo winches with wire whips attached to the camel
The winches provided enough pull on the camel so that the
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pressure of the camel against the ship and dock slowly moved
the ship away from the dock allowing the camels to be slipped
back into their proper position.
The maximum wind velocity was observed at 1930 with
gusts up to 63 knots. The range in tide was observed and it
corresponded with the range computed for the tide tables.
Under the conditions experienced with Gilda, the India
Basin is considered to be a safe, adequate haven. Had the
ship remained at India 1, it is believed that it would have
been more exposed to the southerly winds with a resultant
increase of strain on the mooring lines. The increased
freeboard and absence of protecting buildings would have
compounded the affects of the wind at India 1.
(2) Comments by Operations Officer, Fleet Activi-
ties, Sasebo:
"Typhoon Gilda is the first typhoon to pass to the west
of Kyushu in more than two years. In the past when reaching
the southern tip of Kyushu, typhoons would veer to the north-
east or go inland. Effects of these typhoons were minimum
as to winds . . . The most noteworthy item about Gilda was
the slowdown in her northerly movement as she approached
west of Sasebo. She reached her maximum winds at about the
time of high tide. This caused large amounts of water to
break over seawalls at Tategami and southern walls in both
Juliet and India Basin. Due to prior preparations only"
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"minor storm damage was experienced in Sasebo Harbor.
Sasebo is definitely a safe harbor and typhoon haven."
d. Conclusions:
The following conclusions can be reached from this
case study:
1. Both U.S. naval vessels considered Sasebo
Harbor as a safe typhoon haven during Typhoon
Gilda's passage west of Sasebo.
2. India Basin, berth 8 and 9> can be used
as a shelter from a typhoon passing to
the west of Sasebo. Figure 6b indicates
that some shelter from southerly winds is
provided by the building just to the south
of berth 9» Maximum seas reported during
Gilda's passage were 5' confused.
3. All radars should be used under conditions
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